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Faculty and Deans

lanuary,l956

JOHN MARSHALL IN PERSPECTIVE*

BY DuDLEY W. WooDBRIDGE
Dean, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary

We are met this morning to pay homage to one of
America's greatest Americans-a man whom we at William
and Mary regard as our greatest alumnus-a man whom
your great College honors with his name.
Born in Virginia two hundred years ago this September 24th, John Marshall served under George Washington,
first as Lieutenant, and later as Captain. He saw and participated in the terrible suffering of the Continental troops
at Valley Forge.
But John Marshall is not primarily honored and remembered today because he was a soldier or an athlete or
a diplomat. "By their fruits shall you know them," or in
Marshall's case by his acts-by his decis-ions on great questions of Constitutional Law--do we know him. He was
aptly designated by his great colleague, Mr. Justice Story,
as the "Expounder of the Constitution."
The Constitution of Soviet Russia like our own Constitution guarantees freedom of speech. Section 125 of the
Soviet Constitution reads in part:
In conformity with the interests of the toilers and to the end
of strengthening the socialistic social order, citizens of the
U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: (a) freedom of speech, (b) freedom of the press, (c) freedom of assembly meetings, and freedom
of street parades and demonstrations.

While the Constitutions are_ substantially the same, there
is a great difference, for the interpretation of a constitution
is just as much a part of it as the language itself. To the
Soviet mind freedom of expression simply does not include
the right to criticize the Government. That is as much a
*An address delivered at Franklin and Marshall College, September
15, 1955 at exercises held by the College, in conjunction with the
Lancaster Bar Association, to honor the memory of one of its founding
namesakes.
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rule with them as it is with us that freedom of speech does
not give one the right falsely to cry out "Fire!" "Fire!"
in a crO\vded theatre. In other \VOrds freedom of expression
in Russia is freedom to praise or criticize what the ruling
classes \Vant praised or criticized.
That the same words mean vastly different things to
different people is perfectly illustrated by the almost infinite
number of interpretations of the Bible. Fortunately for us
today, no one can force his interpretation of the Bible on
others as the only true one. In the case of our Constitution
there have been vast differences of opinion. But while our
Government does not compel us to live by the Bible, we are
compelled to live by our Constitution, and, therefore, it is
of great importance that we have the best possible way of
knowing what our Constitution means.
The Executive is bound by the Constitution and the
Congress is bound by the Constitution just as much as are
all the courts. It is then quite logical to reason that in
executive matters the President is the one who determines
what he can or cannot do under the Constitution, that in
Legislative matters the Congress determines what laws it
can constitutionally pass, and that in matters purely judicial
the Supreme Court of the United States determines what
can or cannot be done. The Constitution of the United
States itself does not expressly cover this most important
matter, but since each branch of the Government is on an
equality with the other two branches how could one branch
be superior to the others, and, in effect, exercise a veto
over what the ·other co-ordinate branches wish to do?
The first and the most famous of Marshall's Constitutional Law Cases I wish to comment on this morning is the
case of Marbury v. Madison in which the Supreme Court
decided that it had the last word on what can be constitutionally done not only by the courts, but by the Congress,
and by implication, the Executive.
One of the last acts of the Federalist administration
of John Adams was the issuance of some commissions to
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several persons, one of whom was Marbury, empowering
them to be Justices of the Peace in the District of Columbia.
Although these commissions had been duly signed and
sealed they had not been actually delivered. The new Republican administration now headed by Thomas Jefferson
declined to deliver the commissions. An Act of Congress
then in force authorized the Supreme Court to "issue writs
of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages
of law, to any courts appointed or persons holding office,
under authority of the United States." So Mr. Marbury
applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to deliver
his commission to him.
Now whether Mr. Marbury was given his commission
or not made little or no difference to the Country and
probably little or no difference to himself. Whether the
Supreme Court could give orders to the President and the
Secretary of State acting pursuant to the orders of the
Pr-esident was a matter of some moment especially when the
Court and the President were not seeing eye to eye on many
matters. There was even some talk of impeachment if the
Court issued the writ. And if the Court failed to issue the
writ, it would seem to thereby decide by implication that it
had no powers over the executive branch of the Government even though it was clearly acting illegally. Thus Chief
Justice Marshall found himself in a dilemma-possibility
of impeachment if he issued the writ; abject surrender if he
did not issue the writ. His escape from the dilemma is one
of the cleverest master strokes of judicial history.
He decided three things : First, that Marbury was entitled to the commission. He lectured the President ior iai1ure to respect Marbury's vested rights telling him that
America was a Government of laws and not of men. He
then stated that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel
the performance of public ministerial acts. He disclaimed
any intention or any authority to control the discretion of
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the executive. It seemed to follow from what he had said
that he was going to grant the \Vrit of Mandamus, but
instead he surprised his adYersaries by deciding that the
Act of Congress conferring original jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court of the United States was in conflict with
the Federal Constitution. That document (article III, Section 2) gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction ( 1)
in all cases affecting ambassadors, other Public Ministers
and Consuls, and (2) in those cases where a State shall be
a party. It then provides that in all other cases arising in
the Federal Courts it shall haYe appellate jurisdiction. Since
issuing writs of mandamus at the request of individuals
does not affect Ambassadors, Public Ministers, or Consuls,
nor involve any State, he held the Act of Congress null and
void as being in conflict with the Constitution. In words that
have rung down the centuries, "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must of necessity expound and interpret the rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each. So if the law be in opposition to the
Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide the
case, conformable to the law, disregarding the Constitution;
or conformable to the Constitution, disregarding the law;
the court must determine which of these conflicting laws
governs the case; this is of the yery essence of judicial duty.
If then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply."
Please note that Marshall established the principle of
judicial supremacy (a) without citing a single authority,
(b) in a case of very little significance in and of itself, (c)
deciding the case according to the wishes of the party then
in power, (d) but lecturing them on the moral duties that
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party had violated. As a result of all this, there was practically no objection from the Country as a whole to the
doctrine of judicial supremacy laid down therein. Rather
the court's opponents directed their fire at its criticism of
the Republican administration.
One shudders to think as to what might have happened
had the Court waited to establish the principle of judicial
supremacy until some red-hot issue divided the Country,
as say the Dred Scott Case, and the Court then for the first
time asserted such a right. And let us not forget that there
were many who took the view that each sovereign state had
the right to determine for itself what acts of Congress were
valid and what acts were not. It requires no imagination
to see what intolerable confusion would have resulted had
the Court not taken a firm stand at the opportune time. It
is of interest to note that no other act of Congress was held
invalid until the ill-fated Dred Scott Decision of 1857. During a period of 166 years the Supreme Court of the United
States has disposed of more than 55,000 cases. In only 79
of these has it held that Acts of Congress were unconstitutional.
But the doctrine of Judicial supremacy still has its foes.
In the February, 1955 issue of the American Bar Association Journal a lawyer and a former judge, Everett C.
McKeage of San Francisco, writes of the Segregation Case
(although he is personally opposed to segregation) (and
you can im<lgine what he would have written if he was a
strong believer in segregation), quote "Here again we have
the example as stated by the late Chief Justice Stone of
that Court when he critically said to his brother Justices,
'The only restraint we know is our own selt-restraint.' ...
History teaches us that the Supreme Court of the United
States, by its decisions, determines for itself its own authority and power in cases before it and amends the Federal
Constitution by such decisions just as surely as though
amended by the process and procedure provided for in the
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Constitution. As ~Ir. Justice Holmes so aptly put it, that
Court sits as a continuing constitutional convention. The
Federal Constitution is whatever the Justices of that Court
say it is .... No lawyer will deny that the Supreme Court,
on many occasions, has overruled its former decisions on
constitutional issues, just as in the instant case on segregation, thus making the meaning of the Constitution depend
upon the indiYidual views of its members. \Vhat was perfectly constitutional yesterday becomes heresy today just
because nine judges (or eYen five, or three) say that it is.
If this sort of thing is not a government of men, then I do
not understand what that expression means. This is judicial omnipotence 'run wild'.
" ... I say that these issues are far too important for
a majority of nine judges to be the final authority on, it
matters not how able, patriotic, and profound they may be.
I stand with Thomas Jefferson, .:\ndrew Jackson, Abraham
Lincoln and Theodore Roose,·elt on this vital subject." (End
of quote)
But someone has to decide what law is supreme,
Should it be the legislature which is most sensitive to the
immediate popular prejudices? Should it be one man only,
the President, or should it be by a majority of the Supreme
Court which is at least one step removed from immediate
popular passions, is disinterested, and has control of neither
the public purse nor the military. Most people today (and
I number myself among them) believe that our liberties,
our rights, and our property are most secure if such a
power is in the Courts where Chief Justice John ~Iarshall
put it in Jf arbury 'iJ. Jfadison.
Beveridge in his life of John ~Iarshall says, "This principle ( ot Judicial Supremacy) is wholly and exclusi\·e\y
American. It is America's original contribution to the science of law. The assertion of it, under the conditions
was the deed of a great man."
?\ow permit me to turn from the political to the economic. In any society based on the division of labor the
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interchange of products is its one most important economic
necessity. Article I, Section 8 of the Federal Constitution
reads in part :
"The Congress shall have Power ... To Regulate Commerce
with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and .with
the Indian Tribes."

You will note that it does not say that the States do not
also ha\·c such a power, and the term "Commerce" is not
defined. One of the chief reasons for the establishment of
the Constitution was the necessity of regulating Commerce
between the several states. Local tariffs and other discriminatory measures had given rise to sharp controversies
during the period of the Articles of Confederation. The first
important case to reach the United States Supreme Court
on the subject of commerce among the several states was
the case of Gi!Jbons v. Ogden, some 35 years after the
adoption of the Constitution.
The State of New York had granted Messieurs Fulton
and Livingston a monopoly or exclusive right to operate
steamboats in the navigable waters in the State of New York
between the City of New York and points in the State of
New Jersey. Ogden was an assignee of this right. Gibbons,
in violation of Ogden's right, was operating two steamboats,
and Ogden sought to enjoin him from so doing. The problem seems a simple one to us today, largely because of
Marshall's reasoning in the final decision, but the most
learned men in the law of New Y ark, including her Chancellor Kent-the author of Kent's Commentaries, second only
to Blackstone in the United States, held that the New York
law was valid and that Gibbons had no right to operate the
vessels within the State of New York, even though he had
a federal license to engage in the coasting trade. It was
urged by the proponents of the monopoly that the United
States Constitution should be interpreted strictly, that
"commerce" as used in the Constitution referred only to the
interchange of goods and not to navigation, and that while
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the State of New York could not levy a tariff on goods
imported from New Jersey, it could require such goods to be
carried on vessels owned and operated by citizens of the
State of New York. The case was argued by some of the
most prominent lawyers of the day. Daniel \\rebster, \Villiam
vVirt, David B. Ogden, Thomas J. Oakley. You will note
that the question involved was not to what extent Congress
can regulate interstate commerce positiYely, but to what
extent has the grant of the power to Congress taken that
power from the states. Chief Justice John ).farshall held
that the term "commerce" includes more than the mere
traffic in goods.
"Commerce," he said, "undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more-it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, i11 all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." (Emphasis added)

He held that the people of eyery portion of every state
have a right to engage in commerce in all its branches, that
commerce included navigation; that such a right is a federal
right, and that the power to regulate commerce given to the
Congress "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledged no limitations, other than
are prescribed in the Constitution." He also laid down the
principle that where there is a conflict or collision between
a state statute and a federal statute, the federal statute must
prevail so long as the federal statute does not ,·iolate the
federal Constitution.
As to whether the Constitution should be strictly construed, John Marshall had this to say:
"This instrument (the Constitution) contains an enumeration
of powers expressly granted by the people to their government.
It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly.
But why ought they to be so construed ? . . . X or is there one
sentence in the Constitution ... that prescribes this rttle. 'Ne do
not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. 'Vhat do
gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend only
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against that enlarged construction, wl1ich would extend words
beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the
application of the term, but should not controvert the principle.
If they contend for that narrow construction which . . . would
deny the government those powers which the words grant, as usually understood, impart, . . . for that narrow construction, which
would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects
ior which it is declared to be instituted, . . . then we cannot percciYe the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the
rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded, as men whose
intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words
which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to
convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and
the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they
ha\·e said. . . . \\'e know of no rule for construing the extent
of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument, \Yhich confers them, taken in connection with the purposes
ior which they were conferred."

cnlike the case of Marbury v. Madiso11, the decision of
Gibbous Y. Ogde1t attracted a great deal of attention and
there were immediate repercussions both favorable and unia,·orable. These repercussions are still with us today.
Those who opposed the New York steamboat monopoly
were jubilant. This was the first great ''trust" decision in
America. Those who feared that states would be deprived of
their pmvcr over the commerce in slaves were alarmed, and
Thomas Jefferson, then eighty-two years of age, was
horrified. In a letter to \Villiam B. Giles (a year before
Jefferson's death) he wrote :
"I sec, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid
strides with which the Federal branch of our government is
adyancing towards the usurpation ·of all the rights reserved to
the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and
domestic; and that, too, hy construction which, if legitimate, leave
no limits to their powers. . . . it is hut too e\"ident that the three
ruling branches (of the federal government) are in combination
to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of the powers resen-ed by them, and to exercise themsch·es all functions foreign
and domestic. Under the power to regulate commerce, they assume
indefinitely that also over agriculture and manufacturers ... "
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Charles \Varren in his History of the American Bar
comments:
"But economic results of more far-reaching intportance than
the mere demolition of the (steamboat) monopoly were involved, which were not appreciated until later years. The opening
of the Hudson River and Long Island Sound to the free passage
of steamboats was the most potent factor in the building up of
New York as a commercial center. The removal of danger of
similar grants of railroad monopolies in other states promoted
immensely the development of interstate communication by steam
throughout the country. . . . In short :Marshall's opinion was the
emancipation proclamation of American Commerce."

This decision has made possible a national economy
which is the admiration and envy- of the \Vorld. But the
precise limits of federal control over commerce have not
yet been marked out. Decade after decade there has been an
increasing federal control. As society becomes more and
more complex and we become more and more interdependent,
we must have more and more regulations. It certainly takes
more rules to operate properly a railroad or an airport than
it does a small private garage.
Now let us note some of the most important constitutional law decisions that have further developed and refined
the doctrines laid down in Gib"'Jo11s v. Ogden.
After holding for scores of years that insurance was
not commerce (Contracts of insurance "are not commodities
to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and
then put up for sale") the Supreme Court reversed itself in
1941. In other words insurance is just as much commerce
as is navigation. But baseball. Ah! There is another question. Baseball is a game.
In lF i/son ". N C"& decided in 1917 it was held that
Congress could fi" the standards of hours and wages on the
Nation's Railroads as a means of pre\'enting a threatened
general strike.
In the so-called Lottery cases decided in 1903, it was
held that Congress in the exercise of its power to regulate
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interstate commerce, might prohibit the transportation of
articles, such as lottery tickets, which have only a moral
relationship to commerce, i.e., articles which can not injure
other goods in transit but can only accomplish their baneful
effect within the state into which they are transported. Certainly the moral aspects of commerce are just as much the
concern of the whole country as are its financial aspects.
And now come the Child Labor Cases. In 1916 Congress
prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of the
products of any mine, quarry, mill, cannery, or factory, in
which within thirty days prior to its removal therefrom
children under the age of 14 had been permitted to work.
By a five to four decision the Act of Congress was declared
invalid because it was not intended as a regulation of interstate commerce but as a regulation of child labor-a matter
for each state to determine for itself. This decision was
over-ruled in United States v. Darby in 1944. Said the
Court:
· "The motive and purpose of the present regulation is plainly
to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy
that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of
competition in distribution of goods produced under sub-standard
labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce
and to the states from and to which the commerce flows."

The same principle is applicable to goods produced by
convict labor. In Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central Railway Co. decided in 1937, a congressional act
making it unlawful knowingly to transport in interstate
commerce goods made by convict labor into any State where
the goods are intended to be received, sold, or used in violation of its laws was upheld as a valid regulation of interstate
commerce.
And the same for farming. Congress, in the exercise
of the power to regulate interstate commerce, may limit the
production of crops and impose fines for production in excess
of quotas.
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And Congress under its commerce powers may even
regulate intrastate freight rates where they affect interstate
rates.
In the Morgan case it was held that a Virginia statute
segregating bus passengers according to race in interstate
trips was void because it was a burden on interstate commerce to compel "any passenger to change his or her seat as
it may be necessary or proper" to preserve the status of
segregation on the trip. "It seems clear to us," said the
majority of the court, "that seating arrangements for the
different races in interstate motor travel require a single
uniform rule to promote and protect national travel."
Just one more case on commerce, and then I am through
pointing out the superstructure that has been built on
Gibbons v. Ogden.
Vvere you, or your parents, broke and out of work in
1939? Suppose the answer is "yes." Suppose you wanted to
start life anew in that fairy land of sunshine and opportunity
known as California. Thousands of people tried that very
thing. As a result staggering problems of health, decency,
and finance resulted. California, in desperation, passed its
"Anti-Oakie Law" by which it attempted to keep indigent
persons out of the State.
Held this cannot constitutionally be done. It is an
interference with interstate commerce. In the words of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, (and it was the philosophy of John Marshall) "(The Constitution) was framed upon the theory
· that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in unison and not division."
So under the Commerce Power Congress has been able
to legislate against monopoly; control to a considerable
extent the business of insurance and navigation, and the
occupation of mining; manufacturing; and agriculture; and
regulate to a considerable degree even our morals and our
local economies.
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I do not join with those who think that this is all bad.
Some things affect the national economy as a whole-far
more now than in 1789-and when they do, planning on a
national scale is just as essential for the best interests of all
as are zoning laws on a local scale for the planning of a city.
John :Marshall had courage of the highest order. He
had physical courage as evidenced by his valor and his fortitude as a soldier. He had moral courage as evidenced by
his conduct of the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. As Chief
Justice his stature was so great that nine people out of ten,
perhaps, take it for granted that he was the first Chief
Justice when in reality he was the fourth-preceded by John
Jay, who thought so ill of the Court that he resigned to
become governor of New York, John Rutledge who thought
so little of the Court that he had once resigned as an
associate justice to serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, and by Oliver Ellsworth.
It was Marshall, more than any other one man, who
placed the judiciary on an actual equality with the legislature
and the President; who made it possible for us to have
liberty under law even as against the Congress and the Chief
Executive; and who formulated the policies that have resulted in a strong national economy without which we could
nner have become a first class world power.
In the perspective of time we now see clearly that John
Marshall was no fleeting comet that flashes across the
heavens, he was no satellite or planet that shines only in the
reflected light of far greater forces, but a fixed star of the
first magnitude whose atomic light reaches us today as undiminished as at the time of his death some one hundred
twenty years ago.
It is a fine thing for the American Bar, and for you of
Franklin and l\Iarshall College, to be associated with the
name of such a man, but it is still a finer thing to be guided
and inspired by his example and his light!

